How to Understand Moscow's Position on Maduro's Arrest?

By Zawar Shawaj – 9 January 2026

Al Jazeera Website

In late December 2025, sailors painted the Russian flag on the side of the oil tanker "Bella 1" and declared that they were operating under Russian jurisdiction. The vessel was subsequently renamed and registered in the Russian Maritime Register, listed under the port of Sochi as the "Marinera" flying the Russian flag. This tanker recently drew attention after the United States seized it in the Atlantic Ocean. The Kremlin swiftly sent a diplomatic note to the United States demanding an end to attempts to detain the tanker. Russia also dispatched a submarine and warships to escort the empty vessel, which was being pursued by the U.S. Coast Guard in the Atlantic, according to the Wall Street Journal and CBS News, citing American officials. However, the Americans, with British assistance, reached the "Marinera" first, seizing it on the 7th of this month and redirecting it to the United States. The U.S. Navy's seizure of the "Marinera" oil tanker provoked mixed reactions in Russia. According to a broad segment of politicians and experts, the seizure marked the beginning of a decisive American shift toward implementing the Monroe Doctrine in its "Trumpian" interpretation. In other words, Washington is now working to eliminate Russian and Chinese influence in the American continent. Russia's official response to the seizure came from the Foreign Ministry and was limited to demanding that the United States guarantee humane and dignified treatment for the Russian citizens aboard the "Marinera," respect their rights, and not obstruct their prompt return home. According to the New York Times, the crew included citizens from Russia, India, and Ukraine. This stance appears, at first glance, tepid and disproportionate to the strategic relationship between Moscow and Caracas amid the U.S. escalation over Venezuela and the arrest of its president and his wife.

A Geopolitical and Economic Loss for Russia

The political year 2026 began with the U.S. military operation against Venezuela and the arrest of the country's president, Nicolás Maduro. The United States' success in changing the regime in Venezuela poses new challenges for Russian leadership. As Russian political scientist Alexei Chernyaev put it, "For Russia, this is a major setback because the Maduro government was, to one degree or another, a Russian partner. Russian investments were flowing into Venezuela, and Russian projects were being implemented there. Consequently, the fate of all this is now in serious doubt." Chernyaev concluded that "if the Americans actually succeed in what they claim, their negotiating position in the Ukrainian settlement will strengthen." To place this event in a broader context, in early December 2025, the White House released the U.S. National Security Strategy—the first under the current Donald Trump administration. Its most prominent feature was prioritizing the Western Hemisphere and explicitly announcing a return to the "Monroe Doctrine" as interpreted by Trump. Behind Trump, the U.S. National Security Council stated outright that the military presence of extra-regional powers in the Western Hemisphere, or their control over strategically important resources or infrastructure, is unacceptable. The strike on Venezuela thus serves as a test and practical application of the ideas in the National Security Strategy. The mechanism Washington employed this time was a practical test of earlier ideas Trump floated during the Iran-Israel war, threatening personal retribution against Iranian leadership—effectively stripping heads of state of their immunity, allowing them to be eliminated, kidnapped, or held hostage. This is exactly what happened in practice with Venezuelan President Maduro, opening the door to extending this mechanism to other countries and regions Washington seeks to reshape. Returning to the impact on Moscow, Venezuela is one of Russia's most prominent allies in South America. Russia has invested economically there for two decades, and we will now examine the most significant of those investments.

Economic Investments

Since 2006, the Russian government and the state-owned company Rosneft have provided loans or credit lines to Venezuela totaling at least $17 billion, according to Reuters calculations in August 2017. Venezuela has never published full details of its debts to Russia, and Reuters' figure is based solely on announced loans and credit lines. This included a $6 billion advance from Rosneft to Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA in exchange for future oil deliveries (Rosneft pays upfront, and PDVSA delivers oil later). As of September 30, 2018—the last date in Rosneft's report—the outstanding prepayments totaled $3.1 billion, excluding undisclosed interest, per a company presentation. In December 2011, Russia provided Caracas with a government loan of up to $4 billion to finance Russian military equipment supplies to Venezuela. Venezuela used at least $3.6 billion of this loan to purchase Russian weapons. Most Russian support for Venezuela has come in the form of loans and debt obligations rather than direct investment. Some loans were restructured and repayments deferred until the end of the current decade, according to Russia's TASS agency. Since late 2022, Russia has not opened any major new credit lines, with cooperation primarily limited to political and commercial aspects, along with some joint energy projects. On May 7, 2025, a strategic partnership agreement was signed between the two countries following talks between Vladimir Putin and Nicolás Maduro. Venezuela thus became the first Latin American country to reach this level of cooperation with Moscow. The Russian president highlighted energy, transport, pharmaceuticals, logistics, healthcare, and humanitarian aid as promising areas. The agreement provides for cooperation in exploring and developing new oil and gas fields, boosting productivity in joint-venture fields, reducing environmental impact through advanced production techniques, and expanding mutually beneficial oil trade operations.

Rosneft has invested nearly $9 billion in Venezuelan projects since 2010 but has yet to see any returns, according to Reuters calculations based on the company's annual reports and internal documents from 2012 to 2015. One Rosneft internal auditor wrote in an email obtained by Reuters: "This will go on forever." The auditor complained that Rosneft received no explanation from PDVSA regarding a $700 million "gap" in the joint project's budget. Internal documents show oil production in Rosneft-PDVS joint ventures was far below expectations. Reuters sources claim Rosneft continued supporting Venezuelan projects for political reasons—to aid Moscow's allies in Caracas. The head of one Russian oil company cooperating with Rosneft in Venezuela told the agency: "From the beginning, this was a purely political project. We all had to contribute." In 2020, RIA Novosti reported that Rosneft's investments in Venezuela had reached $14 billion. Rosneft also became a partner owning shares in Venezuelan companies, acquiring stakes that later plummeted in value. For example, Rosneft held stakes in Petromonagas, Petropiar, Petrozamora, Petromiranda, and Petrovictoria, plus oilfield services and oil trading firms. In 2020, these assets were transferred to Rosneft in exchange for 9.6% of its shares. Rosneft's current market value is equivalent to $54.2 billion. Analysts estimate the current value of Russia's assets in Venezuela at $5.2 billion—roughly one-tenth of Rosneft (precisely 9.6%). These assets have already lost three to four times their value during years of "fruitful cooperation." What will happen to them now, after Venezuela's collapse, is an entirely different question. The conflict between Caracas and Washington poses several risks to Moscow, most notably: writing off or freezing billions in existing debts and investments indefinitely, Russian companies' current and future inability to access oil production projects, and the loss of Russian naphtha exports. The latter is more important to Caracas than to Moscow, as Venezuela produces heavy oil that requires dilution with naphtha for pipeline transport—and Russia has become Caracas's main supplier of this refined product in recent years.

The threat to Russia's oil industry also lies in losing its partnership with Caracas and the implications for the global oil market. Venezuela today is not merely a Latin American country and important ideological ally for Moscow in confronting Washington; it is also an OPEC+ member. Over the past 10 to 15 years, Venezuela has not been bound by specific production quotas under OPEC+ policy—due to U.S. sanctions and production not exceeding 0.8 to 1 million barrels per day. In the future, if production rises, an agreement with Caracas within the organization could be reached. However, "if a U.S.-aligned regime is installed in Venezuela, the country is very likely to completely ignore OPEC+ demands. By controlling Venezuela's oil industry, the United States would gain additional leverage to manipulate the global oil market."

Political and Military Investments

In Russian political and media circles, it is widely believed that the success of the U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro relied not only on American naval superiority or surprise but more on the Venezuelan army's inaction and betrayal by part of Maduro's inner circle. One of the most pressing questions after the U.S. military operation against Venezuela is: Why were Russian weapons and military experts not a factor on the battlefield? Prominent Russian military blogger Alexei Podolyak stated: "The more time passes since the Americans kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the more evidence emerges that Russia played no role in that battle. If it had any role, it was that of a passive observer. Moreover, this passive role could hardly be mere coincidence." Podolyak published notable information on Russian-Venezuelan military cooperation, revealing that in 2024 Moscow appointed Oleg Makarevich as chief Russian military advisor in Venezuela. Makarevich had held the Dnepr group command early in Russia's special military operation in Ukraine but was removed after failing to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensive in summer 2022, which cost Moscow control of the west bank of the Dnieper in Kherson region. He reappeared in Venezuela as chief military advisor, tasked among other things with preparing the Venezuelan army for a potential U.S. invasion. The U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro exposed the Venezuelan air defense system's failure to engage during the attack—despite being theoretically the strongest in South America. According to the Russian military blogger, 7 out of 12 Buk-M2 systems were inoperable due to component shortages, as were most long-range S-300VM systems. Short-range systems like Tor-M1 fared no better. "Only God knows where the thousands of Igla man-portable missiles—over 5,000 reportedly—disappeared." Moreover, "Moscow and Caracas had ample time to fix long- and medium-range air defense systems given the prolonged escalation buildup (at least since summer). Yet none of these obvious measures were taken—not only by the Venezuelans but by the Russians as well."

A Geopolitical-Economic Deal?

After announcing the success of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro's capture, U.S. President Trump stated unequivocally: "You have to understand: Why does China need Venezuelan oil? Why does Russia need it? Why does Iran need it? They don't even exist on this continent." Statements from the U.S. administration and Russian reactions suggest to several Russian political experts that Russia was aware of the Venezuelan operation. Prominent Russian journalist Maxim Shevchenko said Trump's phrase "everything was done directly here" can only mean one thing: that during talks in Florida last December between Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev and Americans, Maduro's fate and all aspects of the forced redistribution of Venezuelan oil shares were discussed—Russia's share in Venezuelan oil extraction alone reaching up to 12% by 2024. Shevchenko believes it is likely the United States pledged to respect Russian interests in Venezuelan oil. Seizing Russian stakes in Venezuela would only push Moscow closer to Beijing—and separating Russia from China is a strategic task for the U.S. administration. In other words, collusion over Venezuela costs the Americans nothing but could play a major role in the Ukrainian file and in detaching Russia from China. This raises a question circulating in Russian discourse: "Did Russia also facilitate understandings with the generals who watched Maduro's extraction from the country without firing on special targets in Caracas—targets overflown by unprotected, heat-flare-less aircraft while swarming with special forces equipped with shoulder-launched air defense systems?"

The Ukrainian Settlement in Light of Shifts in Latin America

Many view Maduro's capture as freeing the Kremlin from "political and moral constraints," unleashing President Putin's hands to do something similar against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his entourage. From Moscow's perspective and per the Ukrainian constitution, Zelenskyy lacks legitimacy. Key figures in his rule are on Russian terrorism lists—especially amid Moscow's promotion of Ukraine's alleged attempt to target a Russian presidential site in Novgorod region. Venezuela's case will undoubtedly affect the quality of upcoming negotiations with the United States, setting a certain tone. "Well, we did it—we did what we wanted, what about you?" Whether Moscow likes it or not, this will be Washington's position. Will Moscow proceed to eliminate Zelenskyy and his circle with a devastating missile strike? This is a complex question no one in Russia can answer definitively. To limit Russian political support for Venezuela, the United States tied its pressure on Venezuela to intensive diplomacy and Ukraine negotiations. Clearly, no one wants conflict with Trump at this moment—including President Putin. There has been extensive talk in Moscow and Washington political and media circles about a plan attributed to President Trump: "trading Maduro for Zelenskyy." The idea was that ending the Ukraine conflict would matter more to Moscow. For the United States, removing Maduro solves the Venezuela problem, but removing Zelenskyy does not solve Ukraine's—perhaps because Ukraine's situation is not so simple. Russian journalist Maxim Shevchenko said: "The Ukrainian issue is tied to global markets and cannot exist in isolation. A 'direct understanding' in the 'Spirit of Anchorage' style (the Alaska summit between Putin and Trump) will occur with Moscow on many global issues." Political researcher Lana Badfvan believes: "The accelerated U.S. hand in reshuffling power cards there is merely a preemptive attempt to pressure the Russian position before the major signing moment, making the Ukrainian negotiating track a mere echo of influence tremors in the Caribbean. This organic linkage confirms Kyiv's fate is now hostage to the 'exchange map' between the Kremlin and White House—where sovereignty is traded for sovereignty, influence for influence, in a cosmic chess game that recognizes no geographic borders. In this clash, implicit understandings between (Putin-Trump) emerge as the sole driving force to end the crisis, engineering a new international reality that upends traditional calculations and imposes 'the logic of the strong' as the sole alternative to chaos."

What Is to Be Done? The Eternal Russian Historical Question

Analyzing official Russian reactions and positions creates the impression that Moscow is treating this as an event unrelated to an allied state in America's backyard—but rather a small, insignificant country on the world's periphery. Since the escalation around Venezuela began, Moscow has called for dialogue and resolving differences without force—as if implicitly acknowledging U.S. accusations against Maduro. Russia's Foreign Ministry quickly welcomed Delcy Rodríguez taking the constitutional oath as president, viewing it as embodying the government's resolve to ensure unity, preserve the power structure, prevent a constitutional crisis, and confront threats and armed aggression from abroad. (Russian Foreign Ministry statement, January 6, 2026) Russian political experts believe Moscow lacks real tools to pressure or influence events in Venezuela. In effect, Moscow acknowledges losing a key strategic ally in the Western Hemisphere. This loss may not be the last—Cuba, Nicaragua, and Colombia are also in Trump's crosshairs. In light of these developments and imposed challenges, Russia must do exactly what the Americans did. According to experts, Russia should conduct a comprehensive review of its global geopolitical assets. If Venezuela is beyond help and not a priority, this requires a strategy within what could be called a "Russian Monroe Doctrine." But if Venezuela is essential—whether in itself or as part of a broader plan—it must not be reduced to a mere exchange deal. Therefore, Venezuela should be discussed not only in the Ukraine context but linked to Russia's positions in the European energy market—though this seems unrealistic given current realities.

Source: Al Jazeera Website

Translated from Arabic